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Abstract:
Why do ideas that have been successfully moved across highly different 
contexts subsequently fail? To answer this question, we use longitudinal 
data on the Dutch organization Villages for Africa that introduced ‘macro-
credit’ loans to rural Tanzanians that would enable them to establish 
their own village enterprises. Only two years after the seemingly 
successful implementation of the idea, it collapsed. Our findings allow us 
to make two key contributions. First, we provide a process model of 
high-distance translation that shows how proponents can strategically 
introduce an idea across highly different contexts by ‘culturally 
detaching’ it from its institutional origins, leading to the idea being 
‘culturally assimilated’ into the recipient context. But, although cultural 
detachment and cultural assimilation indicate the successful translation 
of an idea, the means of doing so can later prompt its rejection. We call 
this the reactance effect of translations across highly different contexts. 
Second, we showcase the role of history for translation theory more 
generally. History – particularly the historical relationship between the 
socio-cultural categories of the mzungu (Swahili: “foreigner”) and the 
villagers – influenced the way in which the macro-credit idea could be 
introduced to villagers and played a key role in its subsequent rejection. 
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INSTITUTIONAL TRANSLATION GONE WRONG:
THE CASE OF VILLAGES FOR AFRICA IN RURAL TANZANIA
ABSTRACT
Why do ideas that have been successfully moved across highly different contexts subsequently 
fail? To answer this question, we use longitudinal data on the Dutch organization Villages for 
Africa that introduced ‘macro-credit’ loans to rural Tanzanians that would enable them to 
establish their own village enterprises. Only two years after the seemingly successful 
implementation of the idea, it collapsed. Our findings allow us to make two key contributions. 
First, we provide a process model of high-distance translation that shows how proponents can 
strategically introduce an idea across highly different contexts by ‘culturally detaching’ it from 
its institutional origins, leading to the idea being ‘culturally assimilated’ into the recipient 
context. But, although cultural detachment and cultural assimilation indicate the successful 
translation of an idea, the means of doing so can later prompt its rejection. We call this the 
reactance effect of translations across highly different contexts. Second, we showcase the role of 
history for translation theory more generally. History – particularly the historical relationship 
between the socio-cultural categories of the mzungu (Swahili: “foreigner”) and the villagers – 
influenced the way in which the macro-credit idea could be introduced to villagers and played a 
key role in its subsequent rejection.
I mean, we can’t disappear. If we disappear anytime soon, then we’re just like everybody else, right? And 
we leave behind capital and the benefits of the capital, but then they’ll going to wait until the next group 
comes in and says: “we want to help you”. It could be a church, it could be an NGO, it could be the 
government with some funding… Persistence and patience…if we stop trying, it’s over, and we’re gone. 
       – VFA Managing Director about Macro-credit Project in rural Tanzania, 2014, Interview no.5
In 2014 the United Nations gave a prestigious award to the Dutch organization Villages for Africa 
(VFA) for successfully introducing into Tanzania the concept of ‘macro-credits’, i.e. the provision 
of loans to groups of villagers which, combined with training, helped them establish and run locally 
owned enterprises. VFA had overcome deeply rooted suspicions of the mzungu (Swahili: 
“foreigner”) and instilled a sense of pride in the villagers for being able to run the enterprises 
independently. This early success elated the members of VFA and prompted them to consider how 
to up-scale the idea and help eradicate poverty in East Africa in a dignified and sustainable way. 
Despite these indicators of success, two years later the macro-credit initiative collapsed, raising 





























































memories and accusations of colonial and post-colonial exploitation. The collision was so intense 
that, to this day, many villagers refuse to work with the mzungu ever again. 
The failure of VFA’s macro-credit idea is a relatively common yet under theorized outcome 
of attempts to move ideas across highly different socio-cultural contexts, particularly between 
Western countries and the developing world (e.g., Bourguignon & Sundberg, 2007; Doucouliagos 
& Paldam, 2009). Through our study of VFA’s failure, we seek to generate insights beyond our 
case by situating it in the literature on ‘institutional translation’, which has provided important 
insights into the transposition of ideas between contexts (for a review, see Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017). 
Existing studies of translation have examined the ‘editing rules’ (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996) by 
which recipients make sense of ideas moving across and within industries (e.g., Czarniawska & 
Joerges, 1996) and have examined how proponents can convey ideas so as to make them relevant 
to a wider number of firms (e.g., Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002). Recently, Lawrence 
(2017) suggested that, for translation theory to move forward, it is important to distinguish types 
of translation contexts in order to identify their distinctive strategies and processes. Translation 
across high institutional distance, such as the macro-credit project, is an example of a distinctive 
and important translation context that has received only modest attention to date (Tracey, Dalpiaz, 
& Phillips, 2018). We know little about how institutional distance – the extent to which socio-
cultural worlds differ – affects the proponent’s ability to introduce an idea, and the recipient’s 
ability to make sense of it (Kostova, 1999). A further blind spot of translation theory is the study 
of failure. Even though, as Mair, Wolf and Seelos (2016) emphasize, the ‘stabilization’ of ideas 
post-adoption cannot be taken for granted, we know very little about why ideas transported from 
one context to another subsequently collapse. 





























































Our longitudinal analysis of VFA’s macro-credit idea addresses these blind spots in translation 
theory and provides two key contributions. Our primary contribution is a process model of high-
distance translation failure that gives explicit attention to the pre- and post- adoption phases of 
translation. Paradoxically, we uncover that success in the pre-adoption phase can have a 
profoundly negative effect on the long-term retention of an idea post-adoption. Our core thesis is 
that the movement of an idea across high institutional distance requires strategies that ‘cultural 
detach’ the idea from its institutional origins. However, ideas cannot be interpreted in a vacuum – 
hence the transported idea will be interpreted in terms of the norms and understandings of the 
recipient context. Cultural detachment, in other words, is followed by ‘cultural assimilation’ – that 
is, the automatic application of local meanings. We identify the strategies by which cultural 
detachment occurs and the mechanisms by which cultural assimilation unfolds. While this dual 
nature of the pre- and post-adoption processes and their interplay are initially indicators of success 
for ideas moving across high institutional distance, they also heighten the risk that, under certain 
conditions, the idea will later be rejected – resulting in subsequent failure. We call this risk of 
emotional arousal and rejection the reactance effect of high-distance translation.
A counter-intuitive implication of these findings is that in order to convey an idea across high 
institutional distance, proponents need to communicate their own cultural norms and values rather 
than focusing exclusively upon adapting the idea to the cultural language of the recipient context. 
However, this requires a rare sense of critical self-reflexivity, which is difficult to exercise as we 
tend to perceive our own norms as highly ‘normal’ or ‘standard’, and thus largely undisputed. 
Our second contribution is to translation theory more broadly. Our study exposes an important 
and previously neglected influence upon the translation and sustained success or failure of adopted 
ideas – namely, the role of history. We show not only how history shapes the present-day 





























































relationship between a proponent and recipient, and how this in turn influences how ideas can be 
introduced to a recipient; but, also, how history may impede the sustainability of ideas over the 
long term by invoking intense emotions that can disrupt carefully prepared initiatives. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The movement of ideas and practices across and between organizations is a long-standing concern 
of institutional theory (Deephouse et al., 2017). As the study of diffusion developed, the early 
emphasis upon isomorphic convergence was nuanced by recognition that organizations vary in 
their responses to socio-cultural prescriptions, and that the movement of ideas typically involves 
at least some measure of institutional ‘translation’ (e.g., Ansari, Fiss, Zajac, 2010; Gondo & Amis, 
2013; Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017). Contrary to approaches that portray ideas as moving intact, studies 
of institutional translation pay attention to how recipients make sense of ideas and wittingly or 
otherwise align them with the socio-cultural norms of their context. Given our concern with the 
movement of ideas between two very different social contexts, we show below how the literature 
on institutional translation framed our approach and highlight underdeveloped questions within 
this literature to which our empirical study provides insights. 
Institutional Translation
The translation perspective starts from the premise that, for ideas to diffuse, they have to be 
understood by recipients – which turns attention to how recipients translate ideas in order to make 
sense of them both before, and as, they are adopted (Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017). As Boxenbaum and 
Battilana (2005: 356) put it: “translation occurs when actors adapt a foreign practice to their own 
institutional context, modifying it or combining it with local practices.”
Translation processes can have important implications. They have been shown to affect and 
alter how organizations see themselves, the practices through which they perform their 
responsibilities, and outcomes such as innovation and regulatory compliance (e.g., Ansari, 





























































Reinecke & Spaan, 2014; Czarniawska & Sévon, 1996; Nicolini, 2010; Pallas, Fredriksson & 
Wedlin, 2016; Wright & Nyberg, 2017). Translation processes have also been shown to influence 
institutional change at the levels of the organizational field and community (e.g., Gond & 
Boxenbaum, 2013; Lawrence, 2017). In short, to understand the movement of ideas and their 
consequences for organizational and field-level change, translation matters.
Translation studies have taken two primary forms. The earliest and most fully developed looks 
at how organizations make sense of ideas and the ‘editing rules’ used during their adoption (Sahlin-
Andersson, 1996). Early examples examined the translation of ideas across industry sectors (e.g., 
Boxenbaum, 2006; Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Waldorff & Greenwood, 2011; Zbaracki, 1998). 
Later studies cover the movement of ideas between MNCs and their subsidiaries (e.g., Ansari et 
al., 2014; Saka, 2004). The second, more recent form of translation analysis examines how 
proponents – ‘carriers’ (Jepperson, 1991) – convey ideas in order to make them acceptable to wider 
numbers of organizations. Various carriers have been explored, notably associations (e.g., 
Greenwood et al., 2002), consultants and clients (Morris & Lancaster, 2006), and the media (e.g., 
Lamin & Zaheer, 2013; Pallas et al., 2016). Greenwood et al. (2002), for example, looked at how 
professional associations make ideas appear relevant to wider numbers of firms by making the 
ideas more abstract, and by providing them with an underlying legitimating rationale. 
Together, these lines of research confirm the central theme of institutional translation – that 
ideas undergo interpretation and reformulation as they move across contexts and that their 
consequences for organizational and institutional change can be significant. But an implicit 
assumption of much translation work is that each organization translates ideas idiosyncratically – 
i.e., “that every translation leads to the emergence of new and unique local versions” 
(Wæraas & Sataøen, 2014: 242; although see Røvik, 2007). Further, translation studies largely 





























































ignore the particular circumstances under which translations occur – even though those 
circumstances might be expected to affect the translation process. Lawrence (2017: 1787), for 
example, found that translation in high stakes contexts is characterized by “profound moral 
challenges” and is associated with particular patterns of translation behavior. The important point 
we take from Lawrence (2017) is the need to distinguish between different types of translation 
contexts in order to identify and understand their distinctive translation processes. 
Translation across High Institutional Distance
Situations of high institutional distance, we contend, constitute a particular type of translation 
context – possibly the most complex – and one that, as Tracey et al. (2018) point out, has received 
modest attention to date. Institutional distance, as it is commonly defined, refers to the extent to 
which the worlds of the proponent and the recipient differ (Boxenbaum & Battilana, 2005; Djelic, 
1998; Gaur & Lu, 2007); or, more formally, the “extent of the similarity or dissimilarity between 
the regulatory, cognitive, and normative institutions of two countries” (Kostova, 1999: 153). 
Kostova’s definition has resonated with international business scholars seeking to uncover 
how ideas move between multinational corporations and their subsidiaries (e.g., Kostova, Roth, & 
Dacin, 2008; Li, Yang, & Yue, 2007; Roth & Kostova, 2003; Xu & Shenkar, 2002). These studies 
provide important insights into which overseas markets are receptive to products and/or services 
– and why. Ghemawat’s (2001, 2007) CAGE framework, for example, identifies a range of factors 
for managers to consider prior to foreign market entry, including cultural, administrative, 
geographic, and economic obstacles. However, there is no concern for translation. 
Organization theorists, in contrast, have focused upon processes of translation and, in doing 
so, raised questions about the completeness of Kostova’s definition. Phillips, Tracey, and Karra 
(2009; see also Tracey et al., 2018), for example, note that countries vary in the relative 
‘entrenchment’ of their norms and understandings because some institutional arrangements are 





























































embedded and reinforced by mature institutional infrastructures whereas others are less so and 
more open to change (Hinings, Logue, & Zietsma, 2017). Entrenchment increases distance. The 
importance of entrenchment is shown by Tracey et. al., (2018), who report how H-Farm, an 
organizational form that first emerged in Silicon Valley, could be successfully introduced into the 
Italian context only by adapting – translating it – to meet deeply entrenched expectations of how 
such organizations should be managed. Similarly, Zilber (2006) shows how the narrative of the 
‘high tech’ industry in Israel was constructed upon the taken for granted “building blocks of Israeli 
culture” (p. 294). Both studies show how recipients pull an idea into their local context. 
Kostova’s definition of distance is also incomplete because of its lack of consideration of the 
relationships between proponents and recipients. In existing studies, the portrayal of institutional 
distance is of two worlds independent of the other. Yet, it seems reasonable to anticipate that 
previous interactions connecting those worlds may harden or ameliorate that distance. Distance, 
in this sense, is not defined simply by differences between the socio-cultural characteristics of two 
worlds, but also by the perceptions held of those from the other world. In suggesting that the history 
of relationships between proponents and recipients matters, we are not referring to the relationships 
between a particular proponent (in our case, VFA) and a particular recipient (the villages) but to 
the relationship between the socio-cultural categories to which they are perceived to belong. In our 
case, VFA was perceived as belonging to the category of the mzungu (Swahili: “foreigner”), which, 
in Phillips et al.’s (2009) language, further ‘entrenched’ the distance between them and the 
villagers because of negative previous experiences with that category. 
A final concern with the translation perspective and one that has particular resonance given 
the nature of our case is the relative lack of attention that has been given to the later stages of the 
translation process, which remain largely unexplored. More typical is a focus upon the early 





























































presentation and adoption of ideas even though ideas “evolve during the implementation process, 
requiring custom adaptation, domestication, and reconfiguration in order to make them meaningful” 
(Ansari et al., 2010: 67). The continued acceptance of translated ideas, however, cannot be 
assumed (Mair et al., 2016; Wright & Nyberg, 2017). In other words, whether translated ideas 
deemed a success at the point of adoption will remain a success cannot be taken for granted.
Given the above, our interest is to understand: Why might ideas that have been successfully 
moved across high institutional distance fail to persist over time? As such, we seek to advance 
translation theory through an explicit analysis of a distinctive and understudied translation context 
– translation across high institutional distance – and by giving especial attention to the history of 
relationships between the proponent and recipient and to understanding delayed translation failure. 
METHODS
Empirical Context
Villages For Africa (VFA) was conceived in Tanzania in 2008 by Willem Mark [pseudonym for a 
European impact investor]. Tanzania was chosen because it is one of the world’s poorest countries, 
especially its rural areas – which host 70% of the population (World Bank, 2016). 
“Tanganyika”, as it was formerly called, was part of German East Africa (1880s-1919) until 
it became a British mandate (1920-1947). The country gained independence in 1961 and united 
with Zanzibar in 1964 to form “Tanzania”. In an attempt to decrease lingering reliance on 
European powers, President Nyerere (in office: 1964-1985) introduced Ujamaa (‘familyhood’) as 
the basis of the country’s socio-economic policies (Tsuruta, 2006). One of the Ujamaa campaigns, 
Operation Vijiji, compulsorily resettled people into designated villages in order to collectivize local 
economic activity (Lawi, 2007). As Tsuruta (2006:113) summarizes: “In an ujamaa village, 
individuals were expected to work together for the sake of village community as a whole, whereas 
the traditional allegiance of rural residents was basically confined within the limits of extended 





























































family.” Nyerere’s policies helped raise literacy rates and strengthened national identity (Legum 
& Mmari, 1995) but economic development did not follow.  
Willem Mark developed VFA following a conversation with Muhammad Yunus, who won 
the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 for revolutionizing the micro-finance industry. Studies had found 
that micro-credits help the poor gain better access to capital, but may also create substantial risks 
for borrowers and make them vulnerable to theft and abuse by opportunistic lenders (e.g., see 
Duggan, 2016). Micro-credits have also been associated with “hundreds of suicides” (Business 
Insider, 2012) arising from the social shaming of borrowers who fail to repay their “deadly debt” 
(The Guardian, 2011) at annualized interest rates as high as 100% (Banerjee & Jackson, 2016).
In response, VFA was established to provide macro-credit loans not to individuals but to an 
entire village for them to start business enterprises that would reduce their dependence upon 
external aid. The overarching purpose was to “help villagers help themselves” by fostering “local 
ownership” (VFA, 2013: 2), a purpose consistent with the recent emphasis in development studies 
(e.g., Andrews, 2013; Evans, 2004). The aim, in other words, was to train recipients how to start 
and manage businesses and thereby foster regional socio-economic development. Macro-loans 
would be repaid at an average effective 2-3% rate of interest1, which would then be reinvested in a 
new region, scaling up the macro-credit model. Willem Mark’s aim resonated with the Tanzanian 
vision “that places communities at the core of national development in determining their own 
priorities and managing the local development process” (Kamei, 2016: 10, emphasis added). 
VFA introduced the macro-credit model into four villages. The enterprises that the villages 
established included pig farms, bull herds, beehives, a fencing business, brick-making, vegetable 
farms, and sunflower fields. The early success of this first cluster attracted significant attention, 
1 Officially, 12% rate of interest. But given an inflation rate of 9-10%, the average effective rate was 2-3%.





























































including the winning of the UN award in 2014. A year later, Willem Mark initiated two additional 
clusters of village enterprises. However, because – from the perspective of VFA – the first cluster 
of villages failed to honor loan repayments, VFA abandoned its operation in 2016. 
Research Design
We studied the macro-credit project from its inception in 2008 to its collapse in 2016 and 
followed the aftermath until the beginning of 2020. We focused on the first four villages that VFA 
established: Villages A, B, C, and D. Because we were sensitive to the cultural distance in our case, 
we invited the third author – who is from the Manyara region and deeply knowledgeable about the 
initiative, which he observed from the very beginning – to help us understand these cultural 
differences and to share authorship. The first and third author spent extended periods in the field, 
whilst the second author played the role of ‘outsider’ in the data analysis and the development of 
our findings (Bartunek & Louis, 1996; Langley, 2013). 
Data Collection Process
Our research involved three rounds of data collection designed to ‘follow events forward’ and 
‘trace them backwards’ (Langley & Tsoukas, 2010). The first round (late-2013 until mid-2014) 
involved familiarizing ourselves with the empirical context by consulting texts on the history of 
Tanzania (e.g., Cornelius, 2015; Iliffe, 1979; & Mwakikagile, 2016). We were attentive to the 
imperial history and to more recent development initiatives in Manyara. In addition, we accessed 
internal VFA documents and conducted five pilot interviews with Willem Mark and his European 
team in order to understand VFA’s approach and vision. 
The second round involved more formal data collection. The first author conducted 18 days 
of fieldwork in Manyara between July and September of 2014. The third author followed VFA’s 
developments initially as an early local employee of VFA’s Village Enterprise Incubator (VEI), 
and from 2016 as a co-author. He interviewed villagers and VEI members and observed 





























































relationships between VFA and villagers. A third round of data collection, from January 2016 until 
January 2020, sought to understand the aftermath of the unanticipated collapse that occurred in 
2016. Follow-up interviews were conducted with VFA and VEI, villagers, and regional politicians. 
Data Sources
We accessed three sources of data: observations, interviews, and documentary material 
(summarized in Table 1). The range of data sources was crucial because of the cross-cultural 
aspects of our case, and, more importantly, because it allowed us to observe and capture the 
perceptions and feelings of VFA and the rural communities.
----------Insert Table 1 about here----------
Observation. We had unrestricted access to on-site observation of the everyday activities of 
VFA and the rural communities. During fieldwork in 2014, the first author shared offices with VFA 
and VEI employees for approximately 10 hours per working day, attended and participated in 
discussions, listened in on calls, and joined social interactions during work breaks. Attending both 
work and informal social interactions allowed her to observe work practices and interactions in situ 
and to clarify their rationales soon after. She recorded her impressions in a personal diary and in a 
field diary. The third author interacted daily with villagers and members of VEI and participated in 
regular videoconferences with VFA. These digital meetings were recorded with Zoom and 
QuickTime (from as early as 2013) and made available to us via Dropbox. 
Interviews and meetings. We conducted 109 interviews. The first author conducted 5 pilot 
interviews prior to fieldwork and 32 during fieldwork. The third author conducted 38 interviews 
after the first author had left the field in 2014. Later, in order to refine our analysis, he conducted 
an additional 34 follow-up interviews (mainly with former village enterprise members). 
Interviewees included 17 VFA members, 20 VEI members, 47 village enterprise members, 20 
village residents, 3 investors in the macro-credit project, and 2 regional politicians. Interviews with 





























































villagers were conducted in Swahili and later translated into English. For interviews conducted via 
Skype, and where the Internet connection was poor, we used a written chat or email to ask questions. 
We recorded and transcribed 61 interviews. For the others, notes were taken in real time and typed 
within 24 hours. We asked informants to reflect on their daily business activities, cross-cultural 
differences, and their struggles and strategies to address them. Interviews lasted between 12 
minutes and 3 hours and averaged 41 minutes. Formal interviews were complemented by daily 
informal conversations with villagers and VFA members – mainly conducted by the third author. 
We also participated in 10 meetings that involved VFA and members of the village enterprises 
where the first and third authors could raise follow-up questions that had emerged during fieldwork. 
Books, documents, and video materials. We collected 1186 pages of written material. We 
began with books and articles on Tanzania’s history and its legal and socio-political system in order 
to clarify our understanding of (a) differences between the institutions of Western society and those 
of Tanzania; and (b) the historical role of foreigners in our research context. This was particularly 
important in order for us to correctly interpret and give meaning to concepts such as ‘mzungu’ 
(Swahili: “foreigner”) and ‘ujamaa’ (Swahili: “familyhood”). For example, reflecting upon his 
work as a mzungu in East Africa, Spitzer (2014: 1), writes:
A common term for a European or “white” person in East Africa is “mzungu” (plural wazungu) [...] 
Historically, it became a synonym for light-skinned foreigners who seem to have the common feature 
of travelling a lot [...] it is certainly linked to both historical and contemporary relations between “North” 
and “South”, between colonialists and those who were colonized, between Europeans and Africans. 
An interview-excerpt by our informants (see p.17-18) adds texture to this understanding of the 
mzungu. The concept of ujamaa was another critical concept in our context. Consistent with our 
informants’ understanding of the term, its meaning is described by Tsuruta (2006: 112):
The original meaning of ujamaa (to be jamaa) is family ties/relationships, or it could also be translated 
as familyhood. Nationalist leaders of independent Tanzania intended to build socialism as the 
extension of traditional communal values inherent in rural extended families, which they found 
'socialistic.' Therefore, the term ujamaa does not escape "the connotations and associations of bonds 





























































of kinship, tribal hospitality, and the welfare obligations of the extended family," (Reeves, 1979: 73) 
even when it is used simply to mean 'modern socialism’.
We had privileged access to an extensive volume of documents provided by VFA and the 
village enterprises (e.g., accounting books), and to the private diary and public blog of one of 
VFA’s directors in which he expressed very personal thoughts about his Tanzanian experience. We 
also collected five self-written “vignettes” (Reay et al., 2019: 8) that narrate in-depth personal 
experiences of relevant events (e.g., village celebrations and meetings). Vignettes are typically re-
constructed descriptive accounts written by the authors themselves (e.g., Abdallah, 2017; Anteby 
& Molnar, 2012), sometimes supplemented with short raw data excerpts to illustrate a particular 
concept or idea (e.g., Mantere & Vaara, 2008). Building on Jarzabowski and Lê (2017), however, 
we were keen to preserve the original voices, feelings, and modes of expression of our Tanzanian 
informants and thus asked them to write the vignettes.  
We had access to agendas of meetings and video calls conducted prior to when we began data 
collection in 2013. Thereafter, the first author was cc’d in e-mail conversations between the VFA 
members, and the third author was part of e-mail exchanges between VFA and VEI. We accessed 
67 minutes of video materials of VFA presenting its ideas to public audiences and investors, and of 
local TV stations reporting on the village enterprises. Visual data allowed us to compare how each 
side talked about the other without the other being present. 
Data Analysis 
Analyzing the data was an iterative process, moving between data, our emerging analysis, and 
existing literature (Eisenhardt, 1989; Langley, 2007; Locke, Golden-Biddle, & Feldman, 2008) 
through three analytical steps (cf. Lawrence, 2017).  





























































Step 1: Developing a case description. We developed a rich case description, which allowed 
us to synthesize the various sources of data and construct an empirical narrative around key events 
(Langley, 1999). Two key insights emerged that guided our subsequent analysis. 
First, our initial interviews revealed the importance of history in our case. Villagers frequently 
spoke about postcolonial encounters with the mzungu and made references to colonial times. Their 
imagery and beliefs about the mzungu thus were ‘historically embedded’ (Vaara & Lamberg, 2016). 
Our subsequent engagement with the literature on history (e.g., Godfrey, 2016; Kipping & Üsdiken, 
2014; Mills et al., 2016; Wadhwani et al., 2018) heightened our awareness that existing research 
typically adopts either a ‘realist’ or a ‘constructionist’ approach. The ‘realist approach’ is the 
“reconstruct[ion] of past events by using historical sources” (Vaara & Lamberg, 2016: 637). In 
contrast, the constructionist view portrays history as an “asset” (Rowlinson et al., 2014) or 
“strategic resource” (Godfrey et al., 2016) that can be manipulated “for a wide variety of creative 
uses” (Wadhwani et al., 2018: 1664). The constructionist view is closely connected to research on 
‘collective memory’, i.e., the continuous reconstruction of shared historical narratives (Halbwachs, 
1992; see also, Funkenstein, 1989; Kansteiner, 2002). These readings on history and memory 
helped our analysis of events and informed our Discussion section.
Second, our case description provided the opportunity to divide our empirical data into 
analytically relevant phases2. This analysis suggested contextual conditions and three subsequent 
phases. The contextual conditions describe the ambivalent perceptions of the mzungu prior to 
VFA’s entry into the region in 2008. The first phase, which we label pre-adoption translation, 
describes VFA’s introduction of the macro-credit idea to several village members and ends with 
the formal establishment of the first village enterprises, i.e., adoption of the idea. The activities 
2 The village enterprises progressed through the phases over different years. Thus, the phases overlap from an 
empirical/temporal standpoint but are distinct analytically – which is why we refrained from imposing timestamps.





























































observed in this phase were deliberate strategies, i.e., intentional steps taken by VFA to convince 
villagers to adopt the idea. The second phase, post-adoption translation, covers the ongoing 
implementing of the idea by the villagers and ends with a sense of local ownership. The activities 
observed in this phase were non-strategic and much more implicit than in the first phase. The third 
phase describes a collision and its aftermath beginning with an intense confrontation between VFA 
and the villagers, culminating with VFA’s abandonment of the macro-credit idea in 2016, and the 
reinforcement of the villagers’ negative perceptions of the mzungu. 
Step 2: Deriving core constructs. We used NVivo to code the raw data and generate tentative 
constructs for the conditions in place before VFA entered Manyara (contextual conditions), the 
strategies by which VFA conveyed the macro-credit idea and that led to its adoption (pre-adoption 
translation), the processes that contributed to the stabilization (post-adoption translation) and the 
subsequent collapse of the idea and its consequences (collision and its aftermath). 
For the contextual conditions, two constructs emerged: ‘historical suspicions’ and ‘hope and 
admiration towards wazungu.’ Four constructs were discerned in the pre-adoption phase (‘using 
surrogates’, ‘political co-optation’, ‘localized customization’, and ‘ceremonial affirmation’), three 
in the post-adoption phase (‘inclusive-exclusivity’, ‘emotive celebration’, ‘materialization of 
social norms’) and two for the collision (in-group shaming’, and ‘historically anchored 
vilification’). In order to better understand the two forms of translation in our case (i.e., the 
strategic pre-adoption form versus the more non-reflective form in the post-adoption phase), we 
then aggregated these constructs into overarching theoretical dimensions. 
In the pre-adoption phase, we aggregated ‘using surrogates’ and ‘political co-optation’ into 
‘concealing foreignness’; and ‘localized customization’ and ‘ceremonial affirmation’ into 
‘adaptive conveyance.’ In the post-adoption phase, ‘inclusive-exclusivity’, ‘materialization of 





























































social norms’ and ‘emotive celebration’ were aggregated into ‘cultural assimilation’. In the third 
phase, we aggregated ‘in-group shaming’ and ‘historically anchored vilification’ into ‘collision’. 
Tables 2a, 2b, 2c and 2d provide illustrative data for each of the constructs that we identified. 
---------Insert Tables 2a-d about here----------
Step 3: Developing a process model. Connecting the constructs and overarching 
dimensions generated a model of high-distance translation failure. In deriving the model, we 
moved between our data and the literatures on translation and organization theory in order to 
determine differences and similarities between our case and existing studies (cf., Langley, 1999, 
2007). Doing so helped us interpret the broader meanings of the pre- and post- adoption phases. 
In the pre-adoption phase, we noticed that ‘concealing foreignness’ and ‘adaptive conveyance’ 
were deliberate strategies that, taken together, really were acts of cultural detachment, whereby 
VFA disconnected the macro-credit idea from their own cultural world in order to motivate 
villagers to adopt it. The post-adoption phase is captured by our construct of cultural assimilation, 
whereby the villagers connected the idea to their local norms. As such, the pre-adoption phase and 
post-adoption phase describe dual forms of translations – one very strategically constructed and 
the other not so. We introduce the model at the beginning of the Findings section. 
Ensuring Robustness
Langley (1999: 707) points out that there will “always be an uncodifiable step that relies on 
the insight and imagination of the researcher.” The imaginative leap from data to constructs and 
then to theory is thus not easy to show. Hence, we took four steps to strengthen the robustness of 
our interpretation. Our first step concerned the composition of authorship. Two authors (one of 
whom is from the local context) were familiar with Tanzanian culture whereas the third had greater 
distance, thus providing the advantage of “intimacy with local settings and the potential for 
distancing” (Langley et al., 2013: 6, see also, Anteby, 2013; Bartunek & Louis, 1996; Langley & 





























































Royer, 2006). To reduce the initial wariness of villagers the first author was introduced by the third 
author as a researcher and someone who wanted to learn from them, thereby distancing her from 
VFA as much as possible. She also engaged in frequent informal interactions with the villagers, to 
the point where most villagers spoke relatively unprompted about their experiences.
Second, we used multiple sources of data that allowed for triangulation and interviewed a 
comprehensive set of actors in order to minimize the chance of bias that might arise from a single 
perspective (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Third, ‘following events forward’ and ‘tracing 
backwards’ (Langley & Tsoukas, 2010) through use of a combination of real-time and secondary 
data reduced the risk of retrospective rationalization (Eisenhardt, 1989). Finally, we shared our 
findings with informants during the stages of data collection and analysis in order to fact-check 
our data and justify our interpretation. These conversations also helped refine our research design, 
including the selection of interviewees and additional documentary materials.
FINDINGS
Our findings reveal the strategies and processes involved in the failed longitudinal 
transposition of ideas across high institutional distance. The constructs presented in our model 
emerged inductively from our data. However, for clarity we briefly introduce the model “as a 
preview” for our theoretical analysis (Patvardhan, Gioia, & Hamilton, 2015: 411). The model is 
summarized in Figure 2.
----------Insert Figure 2 about here----------
Our model begins with the suspicions facing VFA as it entered rural Manyara. These 
suspicions were overcome by VFA in two ways: first, by concealing the foreign origin of the 
macro-credit idea by using local surrogates and village elites to introduce it; and, second, by using 
examples and expressions from the local context (adaptive conveyance) in order to advance how 
a village community could successfully run business enterprises. Emphasis on the local context 





























































resulted in the idea being culturally assimilated into the world of the villagers and their taking 
‘ownership’ of it. Both VFA and the villagers soon believed that the goal of the macro-credit 
initiative – ‘local ownership’ – was being successfully achieved, but neither realized that the term 
meant different things to the other. For VFA, it meant that villagers could profitably and 
independently operate the village enterprises. For the villagers, it meant that there was a widely 
shared acceptance of the enterprises throughout the village, and recognition of the contributions 
that the enterprises would make to the social purposes of the village. This difference came to the 
fore when VFA sought repayment of the loans – which prompted a violent collision that forced 
VFA to abandon the macro-credit idea in Tanzania.  
Contextual Conditions: Historical Suspicions 
Prior to VFA’s arrival in rural Manyara, VFA was aware that villagers perceived the mzungu 
as wealthy, well educated, and admirable but untrustworthy. This attitude of suspicious distrust is 
well illustrated by a long excerpt from one of our interviews: 
Village member: …we consider all white men are wazunga or mzungu, whether from Australia, 
America, or Europe. Chinese and Koreans are also white, but they are differentiated by their eyes. For 
them, we say: “small eyes” …
Interviewer: Okay. So, if you use the term mzungu – what does that actually mean to you?
Village member: When talking with mzungu for the first time, I think there is a hidden truth about 
the agenda… so we talk in the community first to decide whether they say the truth or not. So people 
ask: ‘are you really aware and sure that the wazungu you are working with, are they doing what they 
are telling us here?’ Colonialism was the same way – and it cannot happen again – that wazungu do 
something crucial for their country, and when it’s done they will leave. 
Also, I think that most of the wazungu don’t trust us… 
Interviewer: Why do you think that is? Where does this sentiment come from?
Village member: I think this is because every party – wazungu and Africans – have lots of negative 
things to say and experiences from their past history. When these people meet for the first time, they 
tend to take time to verify the truth. It’s only after they spend some time together that new beliefs 
about each other form which are different from the past. 
Interviewer: And how do you feel about wazungu now?
Village member: …Personally, I still have to take precautions when we meet. First, I also think that 
wazungu are superior to me. Then I ask: Does he mean what he is saying? What did he want to know 





























































from me? What is his hidden agenda? Can we work together? Does he or she feel superior to me? All 
these questions will run through my mind. Then I have to decide if I can be with him or if I have to 
withdraw…. (Rural Villager, Interview no.41)
The same sentiment was reflected in stories told about past interventions by the mzungu, 
including one of a development organization that set up a water pump, ran out of money and 
vanished without teaching the villagers how to service the pump. This story surfaced in at least 
five conversations between villagers and the first author. Another story was of an attempt by 
foreigners to build butcheries for the cows of the Maasai, even though, for the Maasai, cattle are 
equivalent to their children and the idea of killing them is absurd:
To the Maasai, cows are everything – cows are their life. If you have a big number of cows, you are 
so proud of them. But the only thing the Westerners saw is: if there are so many cows, let us establish 
butcheries…So they started to build very modern butcheries here – but none of the Maasai sent their 
cows there. So they failed. They should have consulted the community before they implemented their 
ideas. (Village A, Interview no.27, emphasis added)
The appeal that outsiders should ‘consult the community’ was frequently made, and 
sometimes emotionally linked to Tanzania’s colonial times – as in the story of armed protests 
against the allocation to foreign investors of 45 acres of land that had been under the traditional 
occupancy of over 40 families. Village elders, in particular, made such connections, reminding 
other villagers of the past and that many developing organizations come to ‘repair’ but then leave 
again without any signs of improvement – noting that history continues to repeat itself.
Phase 1 – Pre-adoption Translation by the Proponent 
Concealing Foreignness
Willem Mark had learned over the previous decade of these deeply held suspicions. He 
believed that his health clinic initiative in rural Babati, the capital of Manyara, had been 
unsuccessful because of his own failure to overcome historical suspicions, dryly described by one 
VFA member as “reverse racism” (Field Diary I). Therefore, in order to get villagers to listen to 
the macro-credit idea and avoid the idea being associated with a “bunch of wazungu” (VEI, 





























































Interview no.11), he used surrogates and engaged in the political co-optation of villager elders. 
Doing so successfully concealed the foreignness of the idea being introduced.
Using surrogates. No members of VFA interacted personally with the villagers. Instead, a 
surrogate organization – the Village Enterprise Incubator (VEI) – composed of four university-
educated Tanzanians, each from a different ethnic group, engaged with the villagers on VFA’s 
behalf thus concealing the mzungu involvement. The Managing Director, from the Iraqw3, had an 
MBA from a Tanzanian university and several years of work experience in Europe and sub-
Saharan Africa. The Financial Accountant was from the Mdigo4, and the female Community 
Coordinator from the Sukuma5. The Community Relations Officer, the son of an illiterate local 
farmer from the Nyaturu6, was very aware of his role: 
I was born and grew up in the village with my extended family with no safe water, no electricity, poor 
infrastructure…so I found myself to be very familiar with the life of the villagers, it was easy for me 
to understand the culture, and social events… public markets, worships, local treatments of other 
villages…I was the very right person for the position as interactions with the villagers was a major 
concern. (VEI, Interview no.97)
It was clear from our observations that all four members of VEI were culturally accepted and 
respected and seen as locals, not foreigners. That each member of VEI came from a different ethnic 
group signaled that no group would be favored. Later, many villagers were puzzled as to who or 
what was ‘VFA’. While they knew that the macro-credit idea came from the wazungu, they 
interacted mainly with VEI members and it is they who became their point of reference. 
Political co-optation. In order to further remove any signs of foreign involvement and cast 
the macro-credit idea in a local light, VEI members opened contact with villagers of local influence 
– especially the villager elders. As one VEI member explained:  
3 Cushitic-speaking ethnic group inhabiting the Asrusha and Manyara regions of north-central Tanzania.
4 Chidigo-speaking group (also: Digo) based between Mombasa (southern Kenya) and Tanga (northern Tanzania). 
5 Bantu-ethnic group in north-western Tanzania (16% of Tanzanian population) who speak Sukuma.
6 Bantu Kinyaturu-speaking ethnic group (part of the Turu) inhabiting north-central Tanzania. Historically farmers.





























































VEI member: The village elders play a very important role – they are the gatekeepers in the 
community, and we need to get them on our side… even for us [referring to VEI] this is important 
because we are often younger than the villagers.
VFA member: Is this a problem?
VEI member: Yes. When you are younger, they would only listen to you when you are a priest or a 
pastor… the elders are the ones with the wisdom. (VFA-VEI Discussion)
VEI courted the elders and gently persuaded them to help “educate the community members 
about the opportunity that is at hand” (VEI, Strategy Document). The elders did so at village 
meetings where they explained how the macro-credit idea would serve the village community, thus 
reinforcing the ‘local’ fit of the idea. 
The success of using surrogates and co-opting elders to overcome suspicions of the mzungu by 
concealing the institutional origins of the macro-credit idea was reflected in that 20 villages applied 
to be included in the VFA project. VFA next turned to carefully and adaptively conveying the 
macro-credit idea in a manner that would motivate villagers to implement it. 
Adaptive Conveyance
Before accessing initial loans of between $9,000 and $15,0007, each of the four villages – A, 
B, C and D – selected to participate in the project had to establish a management team and a board 
of directors that included at least one village elder and one woman, and the management teams 
had to attend training sessions. The training sessions explained how to establish and run a business, 
using terms understandable to the villagers, i.e., through localized customization. The awarding of 
plaques at the end of the training ceremonially affirmed the accomplishments of the participants, 
motivating them to apply what they had learned. 
Localized customization. Meticulous attention was given to the preparation and delivery of 
the training sessions, which focused on the technical details of the macro-credit idea and continued 
7 For the purpose of contextualization: 70% of the Tanzanian population lives with less than $2/day. Tanzania’s 
GDP per capita income in 2012 was $1,654; the global average is $13,599 (Tanzania UNDP Report, 2014).





























































even after the village enterprises had been formally established. We observed hour-long 
discussions between VFA and VEI over the specific wording and language that would be used in 
teaching the principles of bookkeeping, or of how to market goods such as honey, pigs, or bulls. 
Training would be provided in Swahili and other native languages, and use local examples that 
would resonate with the villagers and build on their abilities and understandings:  
It’s the combination of how we know how it works here and then how it works in Africa. And this 
constant tension between how we can use what we are used to and fit it into the local context… we 
may have to suggest some things and then they can come back and say ‘No, that’s not going to work 
here. It’s Africa, you know.’ And then we sit down, and we try to figure out an alternative game plan 
B… [trainings should be] all adjusted for the level that’s appropriate.  (VEI-VFA, Discussion)
Care was also taken to avoid any suggestion that ideas were being imposed: “We are injecting 
a lot of ‘us’… [and] I’m sure they’re also a bit frustrated… We really have to make sure that we 
are not being offensive or having unrealistic expectations…” (VEI-VFA, Discussion). VEI also 
carefully avoided raising memories of previous failures, including “the old, failed concepts and 
philosophies of Nyerere” (VFA Managing Director, Blog). One example of how they did so was 
by allowing the management teams and directors to select the name for their enterprise, which to 
the villagers was an important symbolic departure from the more imposed Nyerere approach. 
Ceremonial affirmation. At the completion of the training sessions, participants publicly 
received plaques of achievement followed by the formal transfer of ownership shares. The shares 
had no economic value but were deliberate symbolic signals of VEI’s confidence in the ability of 
the villagers to run – ‘own’ – the businesses that they were about to establish:
We needed to instill a sense of ownership. The management teams and boards of directors needed to 
feel appreciated, looked up to in their communities. They should be proud of their company… so we 
needed to acknowledge them with certificates that they can hang on their walls. (VFA Meeting)
In the ceremonies, held outside the village government office, VEI proudly stressed the 
capabilities of those that had participated in the training program, and emphasized that they were 





























































ready to start businesses that would contribute to the wellbeing of their village communities and 
the future of their children. The can-do attitude and the pride of the trainees grew noticeably:  
The first time I was elected to be the treasurer, I asked ‘How can I be elected without me having any 
education? Any kind of knowledge about financials?’ So [VEI] told me that I shouldn’t be afraid: ‘You 
will know along the way.’ I was given training as a treasurer and now I am comfortable with the 
financial assessments. As a pastor, I now also train other pastors about what I learned from [VEI]. This 
is a big thing for me. (Village A, Interview no.27, emphasis reflects him proudly smiling)
In effect, the ceremonies were a culminating expression of the confidence felt by the villagers 
that they not only understood the practices of running a business, but that they could do it!
Outcome 1: Acritical Adoption 
Each village quickly accepted the terms of the macro-credit loans. Formal contracts, crafted 
in Swahili, were signed – committing villages to invest one-third of profits in a chosen social need, 
another third for repayment of the loan, and the remainder into re-investment in the enterprise. 
VFA members were well aware of the difficulty of legally enforcing the contracts – “they (the 
contracts) were weak, so it was much more symbolic to have them sign these papers…” (VFA, 
Discussion) – and that they would have to rely on informal trust. There was thus no attempt to 
impose a regular repayment schedule. Instead, the villages were given up to 18 months to repay 
the macro-loans at no interest, after which an average effective interest rate of 2-3% would apply. 
Further, each village was given discretion to run its enterprises as they envisioned – reflecting 
Willem’s overarching mission of fostering a sense of ‘local ownership’. 
At the end of Phase 1, VFA and the four management teams believed that they had a shared 
understanding of how the macro-credit project would proceed. There was neither conflict nor 
negotiations over the terms of the loan. On the contrary, the following was typical: “Our business 
is fattening bulls…we received a loan from the investor to buy 50 bulls for $10,000… Our contract 
is for the next 6 months, then we will sell the bulls and repay the investor” (Video archives, Village 
D). Hence, VFA thought the macro-credit project had been successfully introduced and proudly 





























































told VEI that: “Everything is moving…people from Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ghana, Guatemala, 
Ecuador…every time we explain to them what you guys are doing, people get excited and they 
want to know how they can take it into their area…I love this process” (VEI-VFA, Discussion). 
Phase 2 - Post-Adoption Translation by the Recipient 
Cultural Assimilation
To Willem’s delight, once established the village enterprises quickly exhibited entrepreneurial 
initiative. Village B and D diversified into sesame seeds and vegetables; Village C expanded 
beyond pig farming to include honey production and cucumber farming. Three of the villages – B, 
C, and D – reported profits in their first year. The fourth, Village A, which did not, was the only 
village that chose not to go into agricultural farming, and, by setting up the enterprise outside the 
village, was finding it more difficult to garner community support. 
Nevertheless, at the end of the first year the overall performance of the four villages was seen 
by VFA as a visible indicator that the vision of providing “the power and the means to take care of 
themselves” was being realized (VEI, Strategy Document). Therefore, the villagers were quietly 
allowed to operate without much outside help. For the villagers, on the other hand, local ownership 
had not yet been fully achieved: for them, local ownership meant widespread acceptance of the 
enterprise as serving social needs and thus of being an integral part of the village: “the social need 
is the primary goal and the reason for our activities…if there is no social need, there is no need for 
business” (Village A, Interview no.20). In other words, only by achieving social goals would local 
ownership be accomplished. Thus, what VFA did not grasp was that, as the macro-credit idea 
became culturally assimilated into the local context, the sense of local ownership would have 
implications that would adversely affect the macro-credit project. Three prominent mechanisms of 
cultural assimilation were a sense of inclusive-exclusivity by the village communities, the 





























































materialization of social norms, and emotive celebrations. These mechanisms pulled villagers 
together and heightened the sense of ‘ownership’ as they understood the term. 
Inclusive-exclusivity. Inclusive-exclusivity is a widely shared (in our case, throughout the 
village) pride in being part of something that is desired by others who are excluded from 
participating. To promote the sense of shared inclusion, three of the management teams located 
their offices in the centre of the village so that villagers could walk by them and express their 
curiosity. The idea and arrangements of having an office and a management team were novel and 
puzzling, but also intriguing. Villagers learned by wandering past the offices and observing what 
went on inside them. And, as they did so, they began to express interest in being more involved: 
“…people started asking ‘Why are you buying materials from Babati, not from me?’ ‘Why are you 
not hiring my trucks to carry your materials?’ Things like that – they want to be involved” (Village 
C, Interview no.25). Even members of Village A, whose office was located outside the village, 
recalled such encounters:
Sometimes, villagers pass by and they see that we are working and producing goods. Then they will 
try to come inside and ask if they can work here…to see what we are doing. Then they say: ‘You’re 
gaining a lot here, so let me see and gain as much as you gain’… (Village A, Interview no.20)
The management teams responded by engaging more and more villagers – for example, by 
hiring ‘pig men’ who would watch after the pigs at night, and ‘construction workers’ who would 
cut the fences. In this way, the enterprises became increasingly part of the workings of the villages 
rather than something introduced from outside: acceptance of the macro-credit idea was growing. 
Growing acceptance was also helped by the interest and jealousy shown by those excluded 
from the project. There was an increasing daily flow of admiring visitors from neighboring villages 
– to the extent that Villages A, B, C, and D felt as though they had become pilgrimage destinations, 
which was an impression that was reinforced when a local TV station showcased them as pioneers 
and highlighted how the enterprises were addressing community needs. This feeling of being 





























































special was further fostered by the attention of regional politicians who demanded bribes, 
threatening defamation of those that refused to comply. Interestingly, while this posed financial 
challenges to the village enterprises, to several villagers these demands were also signs of success. 
Being ‘in’ was to be part of an exclusive group that was part of something special.
Materialization of social norms. All four villages experienced the growing fame, but it was 
noticeably pronounced in Villages B and C, which were able to materially display how the 
enterprises were reflecting communal norms. By materialization we mean a visual statement that 
expresses community norms. In Village C, for example, where a third of profits were used for 
renovation of the village school, villagers could literally see the benefits: 
…we [contributed to the community] a healthy profit which went into the social need… six classrooms 
in two primary school buildings…a big percentage of the community […] love the Village Company 
because they see the social need which has been implemented… (Village C, Interview no.26)
Village B, similarly, benefited as villagers came to see the renovated teacher’s house: 
We spent almost 4 million on implementing the social needs of our community (we put doors, 
windows, fixed toilets, floor and wall painting). This was remarkable work. And we used it as a 
reference point for our community members: ‘look what we can make and do with our Village 
Company.’ (Village B, Interview no.57)
The importance of the visual showing was indicated by the noticeably lower interest in non-
visual benefits. Village B, for example, not only funded the reconstruction of the teacher’s 
accommodation but also paid the ‘social tax’ levied by the regional government. But far fewer 
references were made to this benefit – it was the visible benefits that excited attention. Village D, 
which used profits to provide health insurance for 490 households (ca. 1470 villagers), had a 
similar experience. Announcement of the benefit attracted some attention within the village itself 
but little from neighboring villages. In other words, while Villages B and C solved a clear social 
problem and had implemented a visible solution, the benefits of health insurance were less evident 
to the villagers. The visual tangibility of the benefits mattered.





























































Emotive celebrations. Each of the three profitable villages celebrated the social benefits as 
they were announced. The opening of the newly renovated school and of the newly constructed 
teacher house in Villages B and C prompted joyous festivities. These celebrations were organized 
by the management teams and were noisy, lengthy and highly public events. Villagers 
enthusiastically engaged in colorful singing, eating, and dancing (see Figure 1). 
----------Insert Figure 1 about here----------
To capture the importance of the celebration as seen by those who participated, we asked a 
VEI member to describe the celebration of the teacher’s house in Village B: 
You have to imagine the celebration like this: village enterprise members worked really hard … and 
they were so proud to benefit their community. When they invested in the social need it was a great 
burden taken off their shoulders. They had met the expectations of their community. 
Now think about the celebration as a day where the management team could show their community 
that they did something good for their neighbors. In Village B, the head mistress of the school was 
living on the street and now she had a house to stay and live. That’s amazing!
The celebration was announced by the village enterprise one week before, and everybody in the 
community was aware about the meeting, as well as neighboring villages. 
The evening before the celebration, a villager had two pieces of iron and moved around the whole 
village hitting them together very hard and loudly – ‘Announcement! Announcement! Announcement! 
The [Village B] is reminding you, the community, about our celebration tomorrow… - informing 
everyone about the day, time, venue, participants, and type of entertainment, and requesting all 
community members to attend… 
The celebration first started with a meeting at 10am. When everyone arrived, people clapped hands 
and stood up. The meeting took place under a big tree where the tables for the guests were decorated. 
The community members waited until the village enterprise members sat down, to sit down themselves. 
Some had to sit on the grass because the chairs couldn’t accommodate everyone!
…The village chairman opened the meeting with a call to religious leaders to pray. Everyone 
appreciated the great efforts done by the village enterprise leaders and promised to support it in the 
future. There was food and drinks (rice with beans, water, and few Coca-Cola sodas)…
The meeting was about 2km away from the school where [Village B] had built the teacher house, 
which allowed classes to continue in the school. After the meeting, all community members were 
walking and dancing to the school… This is a deeply hearted appreciation and is done very rarely. 
Dancing groups around 12 men and women of different ages were welcomed, and they…blew whistles 
while they bent down and were dancing. They sang lyrics of a song which appreciated the village 
enterprise and their leaders for helping in education, for their help with the village social tax…





























































Finally, the pupils were out from their classes and the village community could walk into the teacher 
house, and assess the work done by the village enterprise leaders, and give credit to them. The teacher 
was there too: ‘I lived on the street, in a ghetto… in the raining season, security was not good, and I 
was too far from school. I am an old head mistress. Now I want to thank [Village B]! I only walk two 
minutes to the school, and I also have a toilet that is working. I am so joyful that I can be here for my 
pupils!’ People were chanting and whistling with joy. (Vignette, written by a VEI member)
In other words, the celebrations displayed the rising optimism and communal acceptance of the 
enterprises. In Village D, in contrast, celebration of the primary social benefit – health insurance 
cards – was much more muted. Events were organized at which village members were to formally 
receive their insurance cards, but few villagers attended, and the celebrations resembled more the 
quieter ceremonies of the pre-adoption phase than the joyous celebrations occurring in Villages B 
and C. Moreover, the flow of visitors from outside was modest. 
Outcome 2: Local Ownership
VFA was pleased with the independence displayed by the villagers and especially that three 
of the villages had generated sufficient profits to expand their businesses and invest in social needs. 
Even the fourth village was covering its operating costs. Though VFA started to feel somewhat left 
out as villagers took the enterprises into their own hands, nevertheless they were content: 
VFA member 1: Look, a couple of months ago, would you have thought they would themselves think 
of these new business activities, and actually make profits? I mean, I’d be even happier if they would 
tell us about it. So, we could see and follow their progress…But then, I think we should be grateful 
for that they are thinking for themselves now. 
Let us appreciate their independence. It’s what we’ve been wanting the whole time. Right? 
VFA member 2: It’s amazing if you compare where we stood initially and where we are at now. It’s 
never easy to step back. But let’s allow ourselves to go ahead and re-focus. We want them to feel 
accountable. So, let’s be happy with our progress and march on… (VFA Discussion, emphasis added)
VFA, in other words, saw the villagers as exemplifying Willem’s mission of local ownership. 
For the villagers, too, local ownership had been accomplished. But for them, this meant something 
different. In the three profitable villages there was an open sense that the enterprises were 
recognized by their respective communities. Especially in Villages B and C, more and more 
villagers were proudly referring to ‘our model’. As one management team member put it: “they 





























































are recognizing that what we are doing is good for them. So, they see it’s not just about money for 
ourselves” (Village C, Interview no.25). Similarly, in Village B “the community will always 
remember our village company because of the social need that was implemented…we were very 
successful” (Interview no.57). Even Village D, albeit to a lesser extent, shared this sentiment: “the 
community was happy when we told them about the health insurance…I can conclude that our 
model was good – and successful” (Interview no.89). 
‘Ownership’, in other words, for the villagers was communal and arose from their belief that 
it was they who had figured out how to make the village enterprises work for their communities. 
In their minds, it was not VEI but themselves who had successfully implemented and developed 
the macro-credit idea in a way that worked locally. Thus both VFA and the villagers felt that local 
ownership – as they understood it – had been achieved. Hence, what followed was unexpected. 
Phase 3 – Collision and its Aftermath 
For VFA, the moment seemed appropriate to scale up the macro-credit idea so that they could 
one day, “stand on Mt. Kilimanjaro and see hundreds of village enterprises functioning” (VFA-
VEI, Discussion). Scaling up would mean advising the four villages how to further increase their 
profit margins; and, the repayment of the loans so that VFA could re-invest them in other regions. 
But when VEI and then VFA entered the villages, the response was contrary to what was expected. 
There was in-group shaming of VEI, and historically anchored vilification of VFA. 
In-group shaming. Members of VEI were uncomfortable when asked by VFA to approach 
the villages and request repayment. They were well aware that the now highly developed sense of 
local ownership would make it difficult for villagers to accept advice on how to expand their 
businesses. They warned: “First you make them the ‘owners’ of their own destiny and they do it – 
they run the enterprises... You can’t just go back now and tell them that you have new ideas.” (VEI, 
Interview no.43). They were particularly nervous about requesting repayment because such 





























































behavior would be seen as a cultural violation – especially by those VEI members who had to enter 
villages from the same ethnic group. But VFA insisted that VEI do so. 
As VEI expected, when they entered the villages to offer advice, they were jokingly rebuffed: 
“the management team and the board told us that we VEI members were here because of them, not 
the other way around. They’re right.... it’s their thing now.” (VEI, Interview no.43). The request 
for repayment was even more firmly dismissed because villagers expected VEI to respect the 
ujamaa norm that ‘family’ members do not ask for the return of something borrowed: 
In Tanzania, people are accepting of others ‘borrowing’ what they have in excess (food, clothing, 
shelter, money, etc.) without a necessary plan to repay. So having an abundance of anything… 
effectively invites ‘family’ – which is somewhat loosely defined and extends beyond Western concepts 
of family – to take what they need. So a brother may borrow another brother’s excess savings to pay 
for a celebration, or a trip, or food, etc, ... and never repay it. (Managing Director, VFA, Personal Diary 
– written after the macro-credit project was abandoned)
Villagers were surprised when VEI members, whom they regarded as part of the community, 
asked for repayment and scolded them for doing so. The scolding intensified when villagers 
learned that VEI members were associated with the mzungu. As a VEI member recalled:
I knew it was going to be a huge challenge when I had to ask for repayments…Community members 
were asking me questions like: ‘…Do you love the mzungu company more than us?’ and they said 
things like ‘we are all the same here. Look at our young children here at home…If you put me in 
trouble, how will they feel?’ They expected me to know…serving that community was a priority.
They also frequently mentioned that the mzungu company will go but that I would remain as their son. 
They asked me: ‘Are you married? Maybe one day you will come to marry my daughter…but the 
mzungu will go.’ Clearly reminding me of my own role in this community.
Most borrowers were elder to me, and in Tanzania, a younger person cannot be angry with the elders, 
that is considered misbehavior in our culture. When I asked for repayment, they became very angry 
with me, they said things like ‘you went to school here so that you can help us. But now, you are 
putting us in trouble because of the mzungu!!’ Some of them accused me of wanting to take a bribe. 
I was disappointed, but I never stopped trying to get the repayments. I felt proud to be part of the 
macro-credit model. No repayment would put the model in a hard situation - I knew that. But people 
here cannot take a hard decision towards each other… because they will know that they will hurt their 
fellow family member (Vignette, written by a VEI member)
VEI, in other words, was expected to know and respect that serving social needs was a priority 
and that the interests of VEI’s village community should surely be more important than those of 





























































the mzungu. Acknowledging their contractual agreements, the villagers reassured VEI that 
repayment would be made once local needs had been addressed. But from the perspective of VFA, 
the refusal of the villages to fully repay was evidence of “cheating” and they decided to enter the 
villages themselves (VFA, Discussion). Before doing so, they carefully thought through how best 
to word the request for repayment and rehearsed doing so. Given the earlier success when 
introducing the macro-credit idea, it was hoped that a similarly cautious approach would be 
successful. But this time, it was the mzungu who faced the villagers. 
Historically anchored vilification. As VFA members entered the villages and requested 
repayment, they were angrily vilified, especially in Village B and C. Explicitly referencing 
colonial times, villagers were furious. In one meeting an outraged villager shouted (to applause): 
“There is no colonialism here anymore. Why are you harassing me? Why are you even here, you 
mzungu?... We are not here to write your story” (emphasis in the original). In Village C, where 
VFA put forward more efficient ways by which to obtain water for farming activities, and, at the 
same time, raised the timing of repayment, villagers furiously retorted: “So you are coming here 
to look for us…and you are trying to give the (water) business to [someone outside the village]. 
We don’t want you here. We want you to leave!” A sense of the emotions is given in the following 
vignette, written by one of the villagers in Village B who witnessed a similar incident:  
The mzungu caused deep anger. Because when he came to the meeting, he felt superior to us and didn’t 
really listen. Like, they were different or better somehow. I think many village members were angry 
because they felt that the mzungu is oppressing them like a colonist. That causes deep frustration. The 
villagers said that they didn’t want the mzungu here. 
‘Because you have money, does that mean you can’t listen to us? Yes we have no money, we have no 
education, we are villagers and we don’t know a lot of things, but if we leave that aside we can work 
together, but you have to listen to us!’, one of the villagers shouted standing up in the meeting.
After that happened, the mzungu then preferred to come with his lawyer. When the community saw 
that, they were becoming even more angry. They said: ‘now you are coming to our village to jail us.’ 
People were scared that if the lawyer is here, police will be here soon. So, they were not willing to talk 
anymore. ‘Tell the mzungu to let the lawyer go outside,’ they said. Like a boycott.





























































We said that we wouldn’t talk to the mzungu until the lawyer leaves the meeting. ‘This is not an 
amicable situation. Why is this a court matter? If he doesn’t leave, there will be no more meeting.’ 
Instead, we said we would only meet him in court then. So, the lawyer left. He stepped outside, and 
stayed in the car outside, and the meeting continued.
Then everybody started to explain why we didn’t repay yet. We were upset and really angry. ‘You are 
oppressing us and come here as you wish. It’s always the same with you! We have to work together. 
Not you telling us to do something whenever you want.’… so these are bad emotions. 
As far as the villagers were concerned, VFA had violated their agreement and the request for 
repayment confirmed that wazungu were disrespectful and exploitative (Interviews no.45-70). The 
worsening relations were reflected in discussions between VFA and VEI where the language was 
no longer of “we” but of “us versus them”. It was also reflected in the tense exchanges VFA held 
with the village elders and management teams. Both sides were increasingly aggrieved – the 
villagers because they felt that they were being wrongly accused of cheating and were once again 
being exploited; and VFA because they felt themselves to be victims of cheating. The anger carried 
over to VEI. Once they were openly associated with the mzungu they, too, were subjected to 
expressions of anger – to the point of physical violence in one of the villages.  
Outcome 3: Anger and Reluctance to Re-Engage
Overall, VFA recovered less than 50% of its loans. Village D repaid its $10,000 loan in full 
(but deeply resented being asked to do so). Villages B and C each repaid around 40%, and Village 
A less than 30%. The failure to repay and the open hostility towards doing so convinced VFA to 
abandon the macro-credit project. For Willem, this was a major disappointment. In an email 
addressed to VFA members, he wrote: “I have never been more disillusioned in my life.” VFA’s 
managing director expressed a similar sentiment in his personal diary:
Failure. A failure to execute. A failure to learn. A failure to simply let be. I know no more humbling 
gesture a person can make than to put oneself out there for others to challenge. And I have put 
myself out there…
I have failed.
Failed my friends. Failed my family. Failed myself.





























































But mostly, failed to make the impact I promised my friend (referring to Willem Mark) I would 
make when I signed on to this particular part of my journey.
So here I sit. Frustrated. Angry. Disappointed.
For the villagers, the abandonment and the way that it was done was another bitter example 
of how the mzungu could not be trusted. The anger was such that three years later, in a follow-up 
interview, a former board member scathingly rebuked the third author: 
Next time… do not come back with your ideas, then start implementing them, and then leave us. Just 
because we are villagers does not mean that we are not knowledgeable. And – don’t ever make us your 
laboratory test animals ever again. (Village B, Interview no.67 – italics indicate sharply raised voice)
All four villages are still highly reluctant to re-engage with wazungu. In our follow-up 
interviews, villagers talk about a loss of trust and the painful realization and disappointment that 
the mzungu, again, had not listened to them properly. Even Village D, which repaid its loan in full, 
adamantly refuses any further connection with VEI and foreigners and their innovative ideas: 
You left us as if we are the thieves… I’m not willing to talk to [VEI members] or [anyone related to 
VEI] about the village enterprises anymore. (Interview no.80)
For the four local members of VEI, the withdrawal was especially painful – to the point that they 
still feel ashamed to enter these villages to this day. 
DISCUSSION
Despite their importance and prevalence, processes of translation across high institutional 
distance have received only modest attention and the study of failure has been virtually ignored. 
Hence, we set out to explore why ideas that are successfully moved across high institutional 
distance may subsequently fail. Our findings suggest a pre- and a post-adoption translation phase. 
While the pre-adoption phase is characterized by strategies that culturally detach the idea from its 
institutional origins and thereby allow the proponent to successfully introduce it to another context, 
the post-adoption phase is characterized by the intuitive cultural assimilation of an idea into the 
recipient context. The pre- and post-adoption phases thus represent two different forms of 





























































translation. The explanation for the subsequent and disruptive failure lies in the combination of 
this dual translation. Together, the strategies of cultural detachment and the mechanisms of cultural 
assimilation enable the successful translation of an idea across high institutional distance. 
Paradoxically, however, the means of doing so can later prompt its emotional rejection. We call 
this this the reactance effect of high-distance translation. Our primary contribution is the 
abstraction of the above findings into a process model of high-distance translation failure. 
Our second contribution speaks to the translation literature more generally. Our findings bring 
to the fore how previous relationships, which have been neglected in studies of translation, 
influence the ways by which an idea can be moved and translated. Specifically, our case shows the 
importance of relationships between the socio-cultural categories of proponents and recipients. 
Further, our findings suggest a more significant way by which historical relationships matter for 
translation processes – namely, by invoking emotions that may lead to violent disruptions. 
High-Distance Translation Failure and the Reactance Effect 
The process model derived from our case study is depictured in Figure 2. While the violent 
collision towards the end of the model is striking, we begin by detailing the pre-adoption phase 
because, as pointed out above, the unexpected failure arises from the combination of pre- and post- 
adoption processes that define high distance translation. In so doing, we specify the nature of high-
distance translations as a particular type of translation context (cf., Lawrence, 2017) that requires 
strategies of translation different from those of other contexts.
Pre-adoption translation by cultural detachment. Moving ideas across high institutional 
distance is difficult for several reasons. The more obvious one is that it may be difficult for 
recipients to grasp the meaning of an idea because of its novelty – as, for example, in our case 
‘bookkeeping’ and ‘management teams’ were little understood. Ideas may also be perceived as 
threatening social and political arrangements (e.g., Mair et al., 2016). Relatedly, receptivity may 





























































be compromised by previous experiences involving the proponents and recipients. To overcome 
these challenges, the idea has to be culturally detached from its institutional origins, which 
involves concealing the foreignness of the idea and its adaptive conveyance. 
Concealing foreignness is the involvement of people whom recipients trust and the masking 
of those that they do not in order to downplay the foreign origins of an idea. In contexts of high 
institutional distance, this might be essential, simply to get recipients to listen to the idea (as 
implied by Claus & Tracey, in-press). VFA mastered this challenge by ‘using surrogates’ and 
‘political co-optation’. Political co-optation has been observed elsewhere (Selznick, 1949; see also, 
Mair et al., 2016; McKague, Zietsma, & Oliver, 2015; Venkataram, Vermeulen, Raaijmakers, & 
Mair, 2016) but may not, by itself, prompt the intended recipient to consider an idea, especially if 
relationships between the proponent and recipients are ones of suspicion. More is needed – such 
as using surrogates to avoid the rejection of an idea before it can even be communicated. 
Adaptive conveyance is the presentation of an idea using the cultural language of the recipients. 
As our case shows, the presentation of an idea not only has to be comprehensible, which can be 
achieved through ‘localized customization’ of illustrations and materials; it also has to be 
motivating and persuasive – i.e., seen as doable. Put differently, presenting the ‘nuts and bolts’ of 
an idea (Tracey et al., 2018) may explain an idea – but understanding is distinct from the 
motivation to act. Across high institutional distance where novelty can induce caution, something 
is needed to stimulate adoption, achieved in our case by ‘ceremonial affirmation’.
An important implication of the above is that culturally detaching an idea from its institutional 
origins eases its adoption but strips the idea of its original context – in Geertz’s terms (1973), 
translation and understanding of the idea is ‘thin’. But, ‘thin’ translations mean that the idea will 





























































be understood in terms of the recipient’s cultural context. That is, the idea is then culturally 
assimilated – which can have negative implications in the post-adoption phase. 
Post-adoption translation: cultural assimilation. The cultural detachment of an idea makes 
its attachment to local norms inevitable. Ideas cannot be understood in a vacuum (Delmestri & 
Greenwood, 2016) – hence, recipients will apply local meanings to it. Cultural detachment, in 
other words, is followed by culturally assimilation – i.e., the acritical application of local meanings.
Our case displays three mutually reinforcing mechanisms by which cultural assimilation 
occurs: the ‘materialization of social norms’, the sense of ‘inclusive-exclusivity’, and ‘emotive 
celebration’. Materialization is the presentation of “the local meaning of a concept in concrete 
terms” (Lawrence (2017: 1782; see also, Boxenbaum et al., 2018). In contexts of high institutional 
distance, where recipients have low familiarity with a new idea, material expressions of an idea 
enhance both understanding and acceptance of the idea by visibly connecting it to local norms. In 
our case, ‘seeing’ the schools showcased the implemented idea and clarified its cultural worth. 
Visual connection of an imported idea with the social norms of the recipient community, in other 
words, alleviates apprehensions that the idea is alien to that culture and thus allows its inclusion.
Materialization is given added momentum by a second mechanism – a sense of inclusive-
exclusivity. ‘Inclusive-exclusivity’ is the fostering of a shared yet restricted ‘ownership’ of a 
‘valued’ idea. It is inclusive in that it is shared by community insiders, and it is exclusive in that it 
is praised and desired by outsiders who are denied inclusion – noticeably observed in our case as 
villagers showed pride at receiving attention from local TV, and of being a ‘pilgrimage destination’ 
for neighboring villages. This sense of being part of something valuable heightens a sense of social 
identity and enhances pride in, and commitment to, the idea (Hogg & Terry, 2000; Glynn, 2017). 





























































A third mechanism – ‘emotive celebration’ – amplifies further acceptance of an idea but also 
adds the important contribution of moral reinforcement. The role of rituals and ceremonies has 
been raised elsewhere (e.g., Anand & Watson, 2004; Rao & Dutta, 2012; Ruebottom & Auster, 
2017), but the post-adoption celebrations in Villages B and C were distinctive in that they were 
held in public spaces, applauded ‘communal’ not individual benefits, and wittingly incited the 
emotions of collective pride. Moreover, the format of the celebrations was the same as used for 
other important events such as the welcoming of visiting dignitaries – thus enhancing the symbolic 
significance of the celebration. The format gave credence to the social object being celebrated and 
aroused emotional energy that bestowed a sense of collective ownership. 
The three mechanisms reinforce each other. Inclusive-inclusivity generates pride, which is 
enhanced by materialization, which in turn prompts, and is amplified by, emotive celebrations; 
this cycle of reinforcement is then reciprocated as celebrations generate collective excitement, thus 
increasing the sense of inclusive-exclusivity. Through this cycling of reciprocal processes a newly 
introduced idea becomes stabilized and emotionally institutionalized within the local context – i.e., 
‘locally owned’. Hence, at the surface level, cultural assimilation appears to signal the successful 
translation of an idea across high institutional distance. But, as shown in Figure 2, it can be 
followed by implosive failure – which prompts our central question: What causes a successfully 
transported idea to suddenly collapse into failure? 
From success to failure: the reactance effect. Our thesis is that failure arises because cultural 
detachment followed by cultural assimilation invokes a sense of local ownership and ‘hubris’ 
(Cappellaro, Tracey, & Greenwood, 2019). The success of cultural detachment combined with the 
success of cultural assimilation means that recipients see the adopted idea and its outcomes as 
‘theirs’. Attempts by outsiders to revoke or change the assimilated idea will thus be angrily resisted. 





























































Double success, in other words, paradoxically risks subsequent failure. We coin this risk of the 
emotional rejection of an adopted idea the reactance effect of high-distance translation.
‘Reactance’ describes the unpleasant emotional arousal to persons, rules, or regulations that 
threaten specific behavioral freedoms (Brehm, 1966). It was first termed by psychologist Jack 
Brehm to conceptualize the resistance that people display when they feel that someone is taking 
away their choices or limiting the range of alternatives that they had previously enjoyed (Miron & 
Brehm, 2006). Once the resistance is triggered, people tend to strengthen a view or attitude that is 
contrary to the view or attitude held by the person who is perceived to be ‘taking away’ their 
choices, which further increases people’s resistance to opposition. Our case is an institutional 
variant of this effect: villagers, by means of cultural assimilation, entrenched the idea in the local 
context and in so doing invoked a nascent emotional resistance to perceived violations of their 
discretion – especially if those violations contradicted their social norms. 
The paradox in our case is that Willem was very sensitive to prevailing cultural norms and 
wanted villagers to take ownership of his idea. His cultural sensitivity, however, also meant that 
the villagers never learned the more implicit norms, values, and meanings underpinning the 
Western understanding of terms such as ‘local ownership’, ‘entrepreneurship’, and ‘contracts.’ 
The same words used by the villagers and VFA embodied very different meanings but neither side 
became aware of the differences. In consequence, cultural assimilation developed unchecked – 
heightening the sense of local ownership. This lack of understanding on both sides would be 
immaterial, unless, as in our case, the two sides had reason to re-connect. 
The counter-intuitive implication that follows is that in order to avoid the reactance effect, 
proponents need to appropriately moderate the process of cultural assimilation by communicating 
their own socio-cultural assumptions and meanings whilst expressing (translating) them through the 





























































cultural language of the recipients. This requirement – a core challenge for achieving long-term 
stabilization in contexts of high distance translation – has been underappreciated in the existing 
literature, which has emphasized instead the need for a thorough cultural understanding of the 
recipient’s context. The translation challenge is typically depicted as understanding “what is 
important to people from different nations” (Erdman, 2017: 13; see also, Beugelsdijk, Kostova & 
Roth, 2017). The same emphasis – of understanding the recipient’s context – runs through the 
various cultural frameworks developed for business leaders (e.g., Hofstede, 1980; see also, Erez, 
2011). However, as our case highlights, grasping the others’ world distracts from understanding and 
conveying one’s own world. But, conveying ideas across contexts requires understanding of one’s 
own world, not simply that of the other, in order that a more informed translation can occur. Doing 
so, however, is difficult because recognizing one’s own cultural assumptions requires a 
sophisticated capability of critical self-reflexivity – i.e., of ‘immanent sensemaking’ (Sandberg & 
Tsoukas, 2015). The challenge is that our own norms, values, and beliefs tend to be unthinkingly 
accepted as ‘normal’ – hence they remain invisible and unquestioned to us.
Even if understanding of one’s own culture is achieved, the potential of the reactance effect 
being triggered remains high because any reduction of the degree of cultural detachment increases 
the risk of resistance during the pre-adoption phase – especially if doing so undermines the ability 
of proponents to gain the right to be heard. Our case implies, in other words, that the greater the 
institutional distance, the greater the need for cultural detachment – but with the consequence that 
the risk of reactance and failure is heightened. 
The reactance effect, of course, remains latent until triggered. Something has to spike the 
emotional resistance of villagers. In the case of VFA, it was the physical re-appearance of the 
mzungu, which reminded villagers of past failures and elicited feelings of anger. Various other 





























































triggers are possible in situations of high distance. It could be treating actors within the recipient 
context in ways contrary to social norms – such as not appropriately displaying respect for the 
position of elders or the role of women (e.g., de la Chaux, Haugh & Greenwood, 2018); or the use 
of language that demeans or fails to respect social structures (e.g., Adut, 2008; Forster, 1924); or 
breaches of local customs – such as the wearing of certain clothes, inappropriate seating 
arrangements in public events (e.g., Dacin et al., 2010); or being associated with deviant social 
behaviors or social classes (e.g., Adut, 2008; Hampel & Tracey, 2017). The common theme is that 
triggers are violations of prevailing social arrangements.
History, Relationships and Emotions
The role of history surfaced throughout our findings in two ways. It shaped the relationship 
between the proponent and recipients involved in the translation process; and, more importantly, 
it was a decisive factor in precipitating the violent collision that concluded that process. From our 
case, therefore, we draw two key insights: the importance of including historical relationships in 
translation accounts – especially relationships between the socio-cultural categories involved; and 
the significance of emotions in constraining reflective applications of the past. 
Socio-cultural categories and the process of translation. Previous work has 
underappreciated the effect of the historical relationships between those promoting an idea and 
those receiving it. This neglect might arise from the priority given to how recipients ‘edit’ an idea 
into their context, but examining the ‘pushing’ of an idea into a foreign context foregrounds the 
relationship between the socio-cultural categories of the proponents and recipients involved (in 
our case, Tanzanian villagers and the mzungu). As our case shows, recollections and/or knowledge 
of previous interactions between the socio-cultural categories of proponents and recipients provide 
the context within which the translation process takes place. And, as such, those memories and 
knowledge define and limit how proponents might approach recipients, and how recipients might 





























































respond and translate a foreign idea. In our case, the suspicions of the Tanzanian villagers 
(suspicions that arose from previous interventions by Westerners that had been unsuccessful) 
forced VFA to conceal its presence in the villages and adapt the delivery of the macro-credit idea 
in a culturally sensitive way. If the previous relationships had been amicable or even neutral, these 
strategies might not have been necessary (and the subsequent failure less likely). 
Giving attention to the socio-cultural categories involved in a translation relationship, 
however, goes deeper than simply comparing the backgrounds of proponents and recipients. It also 
requires giving attention to cultural associations of the idea. To draw on an example beyond our 
case, Cuba Emprende, a social enterprise in Havana, has long sought – unsuccessfully – to 
introduce into Cuba concepts such as ‘entrepreneurship ecosystems’ and ‘capitalism’. Even though 
Cuba Emprende is a Cuban organization, these terms are associated with ‘the U.S’ and thus 
rejected (Claus & Ravasi, 2020). It follows, we suggest, that accounts of translation should give 
attention not only to the relationship between the socio-cultural categories of the proponents and 
the recipients, but also to the socio-cultural categories associated with the actual idea. 
Emotions and historical relationships. Previous exchanges, in our case between the villagers 
and the mzungu, also mattered in a violent way and fundamentally interfered with the stabilization 
of the macro-credit idea. They disrupted the carefully presented initiative and invoked outbursts 
of emotional anger. As such, our findings provide a depiction of history that contrasts with 
portrayals within organization theory of history as a resource that can be ‘used’ (for an exemplary 
review, see Wadhwani et al., 2018) and, in doing so, the findings connect to recent studies that 
seek to qualify the constructionist approach to history. We did not set out to build theory about 
this aspect but suggest that our findings are vital for a nuanced understanding of high-distance 





























































translations; and, further, that they have implications for studies on the role of history in 
organizational studies more generally.   
Recently, scholars have started to qualify the constructionist view of history by highlighting 
limitations to the ‘pliability’ of history. Sasaki, Kotlar, Ravasi, and Vaara (2020: 619), for example, 
show that ‘uses’ of historical recollections by Japanese family firms have to be reconciled “with 
the legacy of an illustrious, revered past” that is not easily amenable to retrospective manipulation. 
Similarly, Sasaki, Ravasi, and Micelotta (2019: 803) show that the commitment of firms to 
maintain good relationships with local communities may “entrap” them in the constitution of 
historical trajectories, despite the changing ambition of their leaders. An even more demanding 
critique is offered by Ravasi, Rindova, and Stigliani (2019) who show that the ‘uses’ of history are 
embedded in mnemonic practices partly carried out outside an organization and which are thus an 
additional constraining factor upon a firm’s ability to mold historical recollections.  
Our observation from the macro-credit case is consistent with this position and takes it further 
by exemplifying how emotions may not just constrain but prohibit the ‘use’ of history. Towards 
the end of our case, there was no conscious reflection. Instead, there was an emotional triggering 
of historical recollections of the mzungu that came as a surprise to both VFA and the villagers. 
In the language of Toubiana and Zietsma (2017), our case shows that recollections of past 
events contain ‘emotional registers’ – deeply held norms of the appropriate emotions associated 
with particular remembrances. Emotional registers colour how past events are remembered and 
recalled. As our case shows, they may drown the reflective and calm reconstruction of the past by 
sparking sudden and intense behaviors that may impede and even destroy carefully fostered 
relationships within just moments (as between VEI and the villagers). 





























































Our portrayal of history is analogous to studies that examine the conditions that can occur in 
people who have experienced a traumatic event and where the recollection evokes intense feelings 
long after the actual traumatic event (APA, 2020). These studies show that it is the emotional 
recollections attached to cognitive accounts of the past that are responsible for automatically 
activating associated feelings of despair (Boals, Rubin, Klein, 2008). As such, emotions prohibit 
careful reflection of the traumatic event and constrain the way in which a recollection of a past 
event can be therapeutically amended, forgotten, or otherwise formed into a more positive memory 
(Boals et al., 2008). Further, intense emotions are highly durable – even as the cognitive account 
of a past experience fades (Boals & Rubin, 2011; Brewin & Holmes, 2003; Stein, Trabasso, & 
Albro, 2001). In our case, the experience is not an individual one as in studies on post-traumatic 
stress, but a shared social consciousness of traumatic events in their history (Olick & Robbins, 
1998). Villagers, in our case, could barely recall any detail about colonial times, but the emotions 
anchored in the historical narrative of those times strikingly persisted. The implication is that 
‘history’ – if attached to strong emotions – is not a resource but a possible liability. 
Studies of post-traumatic stress imply that even if VFA had anticipated the emotional nature 
of colonial and post-colonial history, it would have been extremely difficult to do something about 
it. This might be particularly true for past events associated with negative emotions, which are 
known to affect the availability and persistence of recollections of the past (e.g., Kensinger, 2007; 
Miron-Shatz, Stone, & Kahneman, 2009). In our case, colonial and post-colonial times did not 
represent a ‘revered past’ but one of scorned disdain. 
Boundary Conditions and Future Research 
There are many empirical settings by which one could deepen our understanding of the 
connection between history and emotions. Organizations of the reconciliation movement in 
Canada, for example, have struggled for decades to reconcile the highly emotional, “tragic past [of 





























































Indigenous peoples]…with a desire and need to move forward with respect, strength and dignity” 
(charityvillage, 2016). Similar examples are the rise of fascist organizations in Spain (e.g., Schatz, 
2001) and the interplay of migration flows and the rise of right-wing parties in Germany (ifo, 2017).  
It is always difficult to generalize from a single case study, and particularly one of failure. 
Future research is needed to challenge and apply the insights offered here. Are the strategies and 
processes identified characteristic of all high-distance translation contexts? And, are they unique 
to those contexts? Comparisons with other translation contexts – including those across low 
institutional distance – might be necessary and revealing. Socio-cultural distance, moreover, is 
also found within countries, as indicated by internal wars, conflicts, and profound ideological 
differences (e.g., Sadeh & Zilber, 2019). For example, the term ‘distance’ is relevant to developed 
countries such as the U.S. and the U.K. where racial and social class differences can be acute. 
Countries that have serious religious divides might also have societal arrangements characterized 
by high institutional distance. Learning how ideas can be conveyed across such divides holds 
theoretical promise but may also have important policy implications. 
A final nudge from our study is the importance of adopting a longer-term perspective. 
Translation studies are not alone in organization theory in the tendency to analyze snapshots (as 
pointed out by Hardy & Maguire, 2017). The need to respect the longer term is underlined by our 
case study. In paying more attention to the longitudinal processes of translations, it would be 
particularly interesting to examine translation processes that might occur if ideas of the original 
proponent are reciprocally translated back into their context of origin (Battilana, Anteby, & Sengul, 
2010). The re-importation of culturally adapted ideas could be a source of “reverse innovation” 
(e.g., Govindarajan & Trimble, 2012). Examining the early movement, cultural assimilation, and 
subsequent re-translation of an idea would help complete the cycle of institutional translation.
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TABLE 1  Data Sources
8 Local representatives of VFA in Tanzania. Nine of these interviews were conducted with the third author in his role as a former VEI member.
9 Iliffe (1979) and Cornelius (2015)
10 For example, articles by Meredeth Turshen (1977), Marilyn Little (1991), Marjorie J. Mbilinyi (1972), and Tadasu Tsuruta (2006)
11 Aminzade (2013), Kamei (2016), Lal (2015), Legum & Mmari (1995), Mwakikagile (2016)
12 For example, articles by Yusufu Qwaray Lawi (1999, 2007), John S. Saul (1974), Priya Lal (2010, 2012), and Ronald Aminzade (2003)
Observation* Interviews & Meetings Books, Documents, & Videos
Site Hrs. Interviewee No. # Key Documents and Visuals pp/min
VFA Internal docs (incl. e-mails)
VFA Personal diary & blog entries
VEI Strategy documents
VEs Internal docs (incl. vignettes)
 
Books (2)9, academic articles (15)10 
on Tanzania’s (pre-) colonial 
history
Books (5)11, academic articles 
(24)12 on politics, legal system, & 






    
675
Villages For Africa (VFA) HQ France
Village Enterprise Incubator (VEI) 
Village enterprises (VE)
Group meetings
  incl. Video conferences (remote)
  incl. VFA/VEI/VE meetings
  incl. VFA trainings of VEI
*Note: Only includes formal 
observation hours by first author; does 
not include hours spent in the context 














Active participation in 
group meetings 
  incl. Video conferences









8 Videos produced by VFA & 
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TABLE 2.a  Contextual Conditions: Core Constructs and Illustrative Data
Core Constructs Summary of Constructs Illustrative Data
Historical Suspicions Villagers (unprompted) remind of past 
disappointments with the mzungu and their social 
interventions
“We have this experience with most [foreign] 
organizations: they do trainings, but they leave. 
Or they give grants for water pumps and others 
to help farmers…” (Village resident, Video 
archives)
„…and I heard this consistently from other folks 
that one of the problems with the big NGOs and 
even the churches…is oftentimes you have some 
sort of executives… fly in from the outside 
periodically to monitor things, get their data, get 
the photo ops….then fly back out… (VFA, 
Interview no. 95)
Hope and Admiration Villagers express hope and admiration when they 
talk about the initial proposition of the mzungu
“This model is very different from all the NGOs. 
NGOs come here, implement something, and 
then move out; while then, the project no longer 
exists because it is not implemented by anybody 
anymore. But according to this model, you are 
given capital, and then through that capital, you 
have to create your own development. This is a 
much better model than that of NGOs.” (Village 
A, Interview no. 27)
Observational Data: Villagers are impressed and 
incredibly excited to meet a mzungu, often with 
the hope to be listened to and understood. [We] 
are often followed back to our place, 
accompanied by laughing children and talkative 
residents. (Field Diary)





























































TABLE 2.b  Phase 1 – Pre-adoption Translation: Core Constructs and Illustrative Data
Theoretical Dimension Core Constructs Summary of Constructs Illustrative Data
Using Surrogates VFA hires local 
representatives to become 
the ‘local anchor points’ 
for villagers and to 
minimize the presence of 
wazungu in the villages
VEI is established to minimize the presence of 
wazungu in the villages. VEI consists of 
“village members from the region that can 
connect to the members of the targeted 
villages with their cultural and local 
background.” (VEI, Strategy Document)
“You are the stable part… you’ve been 
around for a while; you guys know what 
you’re doing… we want to establish a model 
based on your hard work... this is the role 





Political Co-Optation VFA uses VEI members to 
connect to village elites 
that help convince 
villagers of the value of 
the macro-credit idea
“[Involving the village elders] is a perfect way 
of sharing new norms, and new traditions. 
More powerful certainly than policy 
statements, handbooks, and very likely laws – 
laws that may or may not apply, or at least 
effectively ‘reach’ these communities. When 
told by respected community members, and 
reinforced through ongoing assessment and 
dialog, then the new norms that align the 
interest of the investors with the desires of the 
Village Enterprises have a good chance of 
being embraced.” (Personal Blog, VFA 
Managing Director (MD))































































VFA pays particular 
attention to communicating 
the macro-credit idea in a 
culturally meaningful and 
locally accessible way
“We continued to march forward...launching a 
new training curriculum – heavily dependent 
on oral tradition (i.e. cases) and highly 
interactive… Again, I emphasize the need for 
the people in the villages to set the priorities 
for their communities and their future…their 
ideas (not ours).” (Personal Diary, VFA MD)
“…I really want to understand… so that we’re 
picking the right words and those words are 
being translated appropriately and that we’re 
doing the things that will help them… (VFA 






VFA uses ceremonies to 
recognize villagers’ 
progress in trainings, 
downplay their perceived 
dependence on outside 
help, and affirm their 
independence and worth
Referring to a training certificate ceremony, 
the VFA managing director explains: “This is 
about us getting them energized… they need 
to feel privileged and excited. That’s what we 
need to step away at some point.” (VFA 
members, Discussion, Field Diary)
“…probably the Number 1 thing, above all 
else, is the community. All the good things 
that are happening, the community says, 
‘that’s our village company’. And [when] we 
have some kind of ceremony….we need to do 
that so that people are like ‘Man, this is 
awesome, I love it’…they feel great about it 
because it’s something that has impact and 
they can see the future too.” (VFA member to 
VEI member, Discussion no.3)





























































TABLE 2.c  Phase 2 - Post-adoption Translation: Core Constructs and Illustrative Data
Theoretical Dimension Core Constructs Summary of Constructs Illustrative Data
Reinforcing a Sense of 
Inclusive-Exclusivity
Villagers that are part of the 
macro-credit model begin to 
feel special for being part of 
it and acquire fame in the 
region
In a TV interview that was conducted by a 
local producer, a village resident proudly 
explains: “[VEI is going] to build capacity 
and is ethical when giving out money. They 
build individual abilities within our 
community [...] we are requesting other 
organizations in the Manyara region to 
follow this trend of [VEI]. It is a very new 
and nice system which never happened 
before – where we get money as a group to 
do our business, make profits, and reinvest 







Villages begin to materialize 
their social benefits by using 
their profits to meet social 
needs in their villages (e.g. a 
village school) – producing 
a visual statement of 
community norms. 
Observational Data: Village B uses its 
profits to build a house for the main teacher 
of their village school who could often not 
attend classes in the rainy season as she had 
to travel from a different region every day. 
Village B also invests in alleviating village 
members’ yearly ‘social tax.’ 
Village C uses its profits to renovate their 
classrooms in the village school. Village D 
invests in health care coverage for their 
community members. (Field Diary & 
Internal Documents by VIA and VEI) 
“Seeing is believing in these villages. If they 
don’t see the direct link between the profit 





























































that has been made after six month and that 
it’s put into the social need, they just don’t 
believe it.” (VFA member, Discussion no.2)
“…if the village company could make a 
huge profit, we could implement a huge 
social need, and the community would start 
to understand and cooperate…villagers need 
to see the impact of the company.” (Village 
A, Interview no. 27)
Emotive Celebration Villagers celebrate the 
materialization of social 
norms and their collective 
accomplishments with 
colorful festivities
“Celebration helped us share with the 
community our success of the Village 
Company, and it was like an opportunity to 
teach others about the model - how it works, 
and the benefit of it to them as the 
community. Also, celebrating was like a 
relief for us, after a long time of working 
with the Village Company…On this day we 
ate, drank…we had traditional dances and 
were being congratulated by the community. 
It gave us popularity in the community…” 
(VEI member re-citing a conversation with 
member of Village C, Interview no.97) 
Please see Figure 1 for a visualization and 
our Findings Section for a vignette of this 
construct. 





























































TABLE 2.d  Phase 3 – Collision and its Aftermath: Core Constructs and Illustrative Data
Theoretical Dimension Core Constructs Summary of Constructs Illustrative Data
Collision In-group Shaming VEI members who are 
from the region are 
shamed by other village 
members for being 
associated with wazungu
“Some people in the community, they’re saying 
‘look, you are a Tanzanian... ‘why are you running 
away suddenly like this?’... so, everybody is sad... 
some community members even accused me of 
what we call takasa pesa (‘money laundering’) in 
Swahili – so they thought I was asking a bribe or 
illegal cash.... everybody [is] frustrated…” (VEI, 
Interview no.73)
In informal conversations, VEI members talk about 
feeling “ashamed” and not being able to return to 




VFA members who 
appear in the villages are 
met with intense anger 
and feelings of betrayal 
and exploitation that are 
anchored in past 
experiences with 
wazungu 
“There is no colonialism here anymore. Why are 
you harassing me? Why are you even here, you 
mzungu? We are not here to write your story.” (VEI 
Interview about a meeting between VEI and VFA, 
emphasis in the original)
“You come here to test your model with us, now 
you get it is not working, then you decide to close. 
You made us laboratory animals!” (Village B, 
Interview no. 67)
Please also see our Findings Section for a vignette 
of this construct. 





























































FIGURE 1  Village Celebrations of Material Social Benefits
    
       Source: Third Author’s archive [a village celebrates its accomplishments]





























































FIGURE 2  Process Model of High-Distance Translation Failure 
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